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Abstract
Currently, a plethora of saliency models based on deep
neural networks have led great breakthroughs in many com-
plex high-level vision tasks (e.g. scene description, ob-
ject detection). The robustness of these models, how-
ever, has not yet been studied. In this paper, we propose
a sparse feature-space adversarial attack method against
deep saliency models for the first time. The proposed at-
tack only requires a part of the model information, and is
able to generate a sparser and more insidious adversarial
perturbation, compared to traditional image-space attacks.
These adversarial perturbations are so subtle that a human
observer cannot notice their presences, but the model out-
puts will be revolutionized. This phenomenon raises secu-
rity threats to deep saliency models in practical applica-
tions. We also explore some intriguing properties of the
feature-space attack, e.g. 1) the hidden layers with big-
ger receptive fields generate sparser perturbations, 2) the
deeper hidden layers achieve higher attack success rates,
and 3) different loss functions and different attacked layers
will result in diverse perturbations. Experiments indicate
that the proposed method is able to successfully attack dif-
ferent model architectures across various image scenes.
1. Introduction
Human visual attention is an advanced internal mech-
anism for selecting informative and conspicuous regions
from external visual stimuli. A plethora of saliency models
based on deep neural networks [3–7] have been proposed
in the past decades to predict human gaze by simulating bi-
ological attention mechanisms [8–10]. Bottom-up saliency
is an efficient front-end process to complex back-end high-
level vision tasks such as scene understanding, finer-grained
classification, object recognition, visual description, and
security-related automatic drive applications [1, 2, 11–13].
However, most of current deep neural networks are
(a) Guide Image (b) Original Image (c) Original Output
(d) Image-space Per-
turbation
(e) Image-space Adv-
ersarial Example
(f) Output of Image-
space Adv. Example
(g) Feature-space Per-
turbation
(h) Feature-space Adv-
ersarial Example
(i) Output of Feature-
space Adv. Example
Figure 1: The targeted adversarial examples generated by the pro-
posed feature-space and image-space attacks. Both image-space
and feature-space attacks are able to change the model output to-
ward the guide image by adding some negligible perturbations to
the original image. Besides, as shown in (d) and (g), the adver-
sarial perturbation generated by the feature-space attack is much
sparser than that of the image-space attack. We suggest the readers
to zoom in the figures, especially (b), (e) and (h), for more details
and better observation. Feature-space adversarial attack is more
visually imperceptible and is more dangerous to security-related
applications [1,2]. Notably, the adversarial perturbations in (d) and
(g) are normalized by the min-max linear normalization method
for better observation. In fact, the adversarial perturbations are vi-
sually negligible because the maximum intensity in each channel
is less than 0.07 (the normalized image intensity values are ranging
from 0 to 1). SalGAN [3] serves as the threat model here.
highly vulnerable to the adversarial examples [14], which
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(a) Nontargeted Adv.
Example by KL loss
(b) Nontargeted Adv.
Example by CC loss
(c) Nontargeted Adv.
Example by L1 loss
(d) Output of Adv. Ex-
ample by KL loss
(e) Output of Adv. Ex-
ample by CC loss
(f) Output of Adv. Ex-
ample by L1 loss
Figure 2: The nontargeted adversarial examples generated by dif-
ferent losses. We notice that the non-targeted adversarial pertur-
bations are highly depended on loss functions, and final saliency
maps of different perturbations are totally different. SALICON [4]
serves as the threat model here.
are generated by adding some negligible but deliberate ad-
versarial perturbations to the original image, as shown in
Fig.1. The adversarial perturbation is so subtle that a hu-
man observer cannot notice its presence, but the model out-
puts will be revolutionized. This phenomenon raises secu-
rity threats to deep networks in practical applications.
In this paper, we dig into the feature space of deep
networks, and investigate the feature-space attack against
saliency detection task. We ask and answer the following
questions: (1) Which layers can perform successful feature-
space attack? (2) What is the difference between perturba-
tions generated by image-space and feature-space attacks?
(3) Where (and at which layer) does the output of the threat
model start to spoil when we feed the adversarial example?,
and (4) How can we defend these attacks? To the best of
our knowledge, this is the first work addressing adversarial
attacks against saliency models.
1.1. Related works and concepts
Most of previous works mainly focused on image classi-
fication tasks [15–19], which aimed to fool the image clas-
sifiers to predict a wrong category label. Recently, Xie et
al. [20] extended the adversarial attack to semantic segmen-
tation and object detection fields using a dense adversary
generation method. Generating the adversarial examples
for semantic segmentation and object detection tasks are
much more difficult than classification task, because there
are more threat targets to be attacked, e.g. multiple pixels
or proposals. Metzen et al. [21] explored the universal ad-
versarial perturbations for semantic segmentation task, and
verified the existence of universal perturbations for segmen-
tation models. Universal perturbations are input-agnostic,
and are able to fool the deep networks on the majority of
various input images. Zeng et al. [22] investigated the sub-
set of adversarial examples that correspond to meaningful
changes in 3D physical properties (i.e. rotation, translation,
and illumination conditions), and pointed out that the ad-
versarial attack in 3D physical space is more difficult than
traditional 2D image space.
One explanation for adversarial example is that the sub-
tle adversarial perturbation falls on some areas in the large
and high-dimensional feature space which has not been ex-
plored in the training stage [20]. Compared to image clas-
sification task, saliency detection is a basic pixel-to-pixel
translation problem, which provides an opportunity to di-
rectly observe the internal attention regions of deep net-
works across different levels of representations. Therefore,
investigating the feature-space adversarial attack against the
saliency models helps to understand the internal attention
mechanism of deep networks, and may provide the poten-
tial possibilities to promote deep networks’ robustness.
Most of previous works perform the adversarial attacks
from image-space. For semantic segmentation task [20,21],
the image-space attack generates the adversarial perturba-
tion by calculating the loss between the predicted segmenta-
tion labels of the original image and the guide image in im-
age space (i.e. the predicted segmentation results have the
shape of height×width×channels, normally channels=3 for
RGB image), then back-propagates the gradients of image-
space loss with respect to the original image through the
entire threat model to generate the adversarial perturbation.
Notably, the threat model means the pretrained model to
be attacked. The adversarial attacks may have knowledge
of the threat model including parameters and architectures,
but are not allowed to modify the threat model [23].
Accordingly, the feature-space attack generates adver-
sarial perturbation by computing the loss between the
intermediate representations (i.e. the shape of the in-
termediate representation is height↓×width↓×channels↑,
where height↓ and width↓ represent the downsampled im-
age size, while channels↑ represents the extended chan-
nels, e.g. channels↑=1024 in the 4th convolutional layer
of ResNet-101 [24]) between original image and guide im-
age, then back-propagates the gradients through the lay-
ers before the attacked layer, rather than the entire net-
work. Thus, the feature-space attack requires less informa-
tion about the threat model, and manipulates the interme-
diate high-dimensional representations with smaller spatial
resolutions but greater channels/dimensions.
Generally speaking, most of the adversarial attacks
can be categorized along different dimensions. First, at-
tacks can be classified by the type of desired output. In
Targeted Attack Scenario, the attacks aim to change the
threat model’s output toward some specific guide direc-
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tion. In Nontargeted Attack Scenario, the attacks only
need to destroy the original correct prediction, but the spe-
cific guide direction does not matter. Second, attacks can
also be classified by the amount of knowledge that the
attacks have already known about the threat model [14].
White Box Attacks have full knowledge of the entire threat
model. Black Box Attacks have no knowledge about the
threat model. Black Box Attacks with Probing do not
have full information about the threat model, but can obtain
a part of parameters and architectures of the threat model. In
this paper, the proposed feature-space attack is a variant of
the Black Box Attack with Probing, while the image-space
attack is a White Box attack.
A previous work studied adversarial examples in the fea-
ture space for image classification task. Sabour et al. [25]
tried to fool the image classifier by minimizing the distance
of the internal representations of the original image and the
guide image by a non-iterative optimization method. How-
ever, this work has not revealed the sparsity of feature-space
adversarial attack, and has not investigated the finer-grained
relations between feature-space perturbation and its diver-
sity, perceptibility and aggressivity.
1.2. Our contributions
Our contributions and lessons include:
• We propose the targeted and nontargeted adversarial
attack methods against deep saliency models. The pro-
posed methods are able to perform successful attacks
in both image-space and feature-space across different
network architectures and various image scenes.
• The proposed feature-space attack only requires a part
of information of the threat model, and can completely
change the output of entire model. The generated per-
turbation is sparser and more imperceptible compared
to traditional image-space attack, as shown in Fig.1.
• On the one hand, the success rate of feature-space at-
tack is highly related to the depth of the attacked layer,
i.e. the deeper layers which detect more semantic in-
formation achieve the higher success rates, while the
shallower layers which extract tiny texture and edges
always fail to generate an effective adversarial pertur-
bation. On the other hand, the perceptibility/sparsity
of the generated perturbation is highly depended on
the receptive field of the attacked layer, e.g. when
we attack the SalGAN [3] model which utilizes the
classic encoder-decoder architecture, the context hid-
den layer between the encoder layers and the decoder
layers, which has the biggest receptive field, achieves
the sparsest adversarial perturbation compared to other
layers and image-space attack.
• For targeted attack scenario, when we fix the loss func-
tion, the perturbations from different attacked layers
have discrepant patterns, but result in similar model
predictions toward guide image. Besides, when we fix
the position of attacked layer, the perturbations gener-
ated by different losses also result in similar outputs.
• For the nontargeted attack scenario, different attacked
layers and different loss functions will produce diverse
adversarial perturbations, and result in totally different
outputs, as shown in Fig.2.
• For defending nontargeted attack, we find that the per-
turbations generated by image-space attack are able to
mitigate the perturbations generated by feature-space
attack to a certain extent, however, the perturbations
generated by feature-space attack can not countervail
the image-space attack. The targeted attack is more
difficult to defend, because perturbations generated by
different losses cannot countervail with each other.
2. Proposed Adversarial Attack Method
2.1. Targeted Attack Method
Unlike traditional attacks for image classification [15–
17] and semantic segmentation [20] tasks, which aim to
change the predicted category label of the entire image or
pixels/proposals, we perform the attack by reducing the dis-
tance between the high-dimensional representations of the
adversarial example and the guide image. The general idea
behind the proposed method is shown in Fig.3.
To generate the targeted adversarial perturbation against
the saliency detection model, the goal is distracting the
model attention from the salient regions of the original im-
age towards the salient regions of the guide image, at the
same time, keeping that the adversarial example looks al-
most the same as the original image, i.e. : arg min D0[F
↓
i (G), F
↓
i (I¯)],
in order to: arg min D1[F(G), F(I¯)],
subject to: D2[I, I¯] ≈ 0.
(1)
where F means the threat model, while F(G) and F(I¯) rep-
resent the predicted saliency maps of the guide image G and
the adversarial example I¯. In addition, F↓i (G) and F
↓
i (I¯)
represent the high-dimensional representations of G and I¯,
which are selected from the ith convolution layer of F. Be-
sides, D0 measures the distance between high-dimensional
representations of the adversarial example and the guide im-
age, while D1 measures the distance between model predic-
tions of the adversarial example and the guide image, and
D2 means the perceptual similarity between original input
I and the adversarial example I¯. The smaller values of D0,
D1 and D2 mean the higher similarity.
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Figure 3: This diagram illustrates the main idea behind the proposed sparse feature-space adversarial attack method. In this figure, we
select the SalGAN model [3], which utilizes a classic encoder-decoder architecture, as the threat model. Specifically, we perform the attack
from the context hidden layer between encoder layers and decoder layers of SalGAN model, which obtains 1024 feature maps with small
scale resolution of 6×8. This is because the context hidden layer has the biggest receptive field, and encodes the most important semantic
information into the high-dimensional representations. We further uniformly select 32 feature maps from the 1024 feature maps of the
adversarial example and the guide image respectively. Notably, the positions of the selected sparse feature maps from adversarial example
and guide image are the same. Then we compute the losses between the selected sparse feature map pairs, and back-propagate the gradients
of the feature-space loss with respect to the adversarial example through the known layers before the attacked layer. This way, we generate
a subtle adversarial perturbation, which thoroughly changes the final prediction of the entire threat model. This method can be extended to
attack any layer. When we attack the final output layer, this method becomes the image-space attack. The sparsity of the proposed method
has two meanings. First, we select a fraction of feature maps from hundreds of feature maps of the attacked layer to perform the attack.
Second, the generated adversarial perturbation is sparse and visually imperceptible.
In most cases, we cannot obtain the full information
about the threat model. Suppose that we can only ob-
tain the information of some front-end layers of the threat
model, we can perform the attack from a known convolu-
tion layer as shown in Fig.3. Specifically, we feed the ad-
versarial example I¯ into the threat model F, and obtain the
6 × 8 × 1024 feature maps Fi(I¯) from the ith hidden layer
Fi. Next, we select a fraction of feature maps F↓i (I¯) from
Fi(I¯), e.g. we uniformly select 32 feature maps from the
1024 feature maps of the context hidden layer of SalGAN
model, as shown in Fig.3. In Section-3.3, we further discuss
how many sparse feature maps should we select to guaran-
tee a successful attack. Similarly, we select 32 sparse fea-
ture maps F↓i (G) of guide image G. Importantly, the posi-
tion of each 6× 8× 1 feature map in F↓i (G) is the same as
that of F↓i (I¯), because we tried to permute and mismatch the
feature maps from F↓i (G) and F
↓
i (I¯), but failed to attack the
model. Then, we calculate the feature-space loss between
F↓i (I¯) and F
↓
i (G):
L[F↓i (I¯),F
↓
i (G)] =
1
N
N∑
n=1
KL[F↓in(I¯),F
↓
in
(G)], (2)
where N=32 is the amount of channels of selected sparse
feature maps, and F↓in(I¯) is the nth 6 × 8 × 1 feature map
within F↓i (I¯). KL represents the Kullback-Leibler Diver-
gence metric [26] which is wildly used to measure the simi-
larity between two saliency maps, and the smaller KL score
means the higher similarity. We can adopt some other loss
functions to replace KL metric, e.g. Pearson’s Linear Co-
efficient (CC) metric [26], Normalized Scanpath Saliency
(NSS) metric [27], and L1 distance. We further compare
the performance of difference losses in Section-3.2.
By minimizing L[F↓i (I¯),F
↓
i (G)], especially when at-
tacking the layers which extract the high-level semantic
information, we can reduce the distance between high-
dimensional representations of the adversarial example and
the guide image. This way, the final model prediction
will be modified towards the salient regions of guide im-
age. Surprisingly, by attacking some layers with big re-
ceptive fields, we can generate the much sparser perturba-
tions compared to attacking final output layer, because the
high-dimensional representations in these layers are able to
distract model attention to the explicit target salient region,
while keeping the smooth background region undisturbed.
In other word, the final model prediction is highly depended
on some intermediate hidden layers. If we can obtain the in-
formation of these layers, we can easily destroy the entire
network. We further explore which hidden layers can gen-
erate sparse and valid perturbations in Section-3.3.
We use an iterative gradient descent optimization method
to generate the targeted adversarial example. We set the
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initial perturbation ∆0 = 0, and set the initial adversarial
example I¯0 = I + ∆0 = I. For the tth iteration, we obtain:
∆¯t =
∂L[F↓i (I¯t), F
↓
i (G)]
∂I¯t
,
∆t = γ × ∆¯t−min(∆¯t)max(∆¯t)−min(∆¯t)+ ,
I¯t+1 = I¯t − α∆t,
(3)
where α = 2 × 10−3 is the step size to control the mag-
nitude of the gradient descent. And γ = 0.07 is a scal-
ing hyper-parameter to limit the intensity of perturbation.
 = 1 × 10−8 is a very small positive number, which is
used to guarantee the divisor nonzero. The targeted attack
algorithm terminates until that the model prediction of the
adversarial example is almost the same as that of guide im-
age, i.e. D1[F(G), F(I¯t)] < τ1, where τ1 is the termination
threshold, or it reaches the maximum iteration number.
2.2. Nontargeted Attack Method
In nontargeted attack scenario, the goal is distracting the
model attention away from the salient regions of the original
input, and there is no explicit guide image. We achieve this
by maximizing the distance between high-dimensional rep-
resentations of original input and the adversarial example,
while keeping that the original and the adversarial example
look the same. Similar to the targeted attack, we perform
the nontargeted attack as follows:
∆¯t =
∂L[F↓i (I¯t), F
↓
i (I)]
∂I¯t
,
∆t = γ × ∆¯t−min(∆¯t)max(∆¯t)−min(∆¯t)+ ,
I¯t+1 = I¯t + α∆t.
(4)
The nontargeted attack algorithm terminates until that
the distance between the model predictions of adver-
sarial example and original image are large enough,
i.e. D1[F(I), F(I¯t)] > τ2.
3. Experiments and Discussions
3.1. Threat Model and Attack Performance
As shown in Table 1, we adopt 5 state-of-the-art deep
networks and their variants to test the proposed method.
These thread models are based on different base networks,
and have different architectures. All of the threat models are
trained and tested on the SALICON dataset [32]. More de-
tails about the architectures and parameters of these threat
models are provided in the Supplementary Material.
Experiments indicate that the proposed targeted and non-
targeted attacks cause the significant performance drops for
different saliency models. Hendrycks et al. [33] pointed
out that multi-scale architectures achieve better robust-
ness by propagating features across different scales at each
layer rather than slowly gaining a global representation of
the input as in traditional neural networks. For verifying
this point, we further extend some existing single-stream
Algorithm 1 : Sparse Feature-Space Adversarial Attack
Input:
original image I; guide image G; the threat model F;
the index i of the intermediate layer of F to be attacked;
the amount of channels N of selected feature maps;
the step size of iterative gradient descent α;
the maximum iterations X; the saliency map evaluation metric D1;
the termination thresholds τ1 and τ2 for targeted and nontargeted at-
tacks, respectively;
Output:
the adversarial example I¯;
1: Initialization: ∆0 ← 0; I¯0 ← I + ∆0; t← 0;
2: if (Targeted Attack) then
3: Select N sparse feature maps F↓i (G)) from Fi(G);
4: while (t < X or D1[F(G), F(I¯t)] ≥ τ1) do
5: Select N feature maps F↓i (I¯t)) from Fi(I¯t);
6: ∆¯t ← ∂L[F
↓
i (I¯t), F
↓
i (G)]
∂I¯t
;
7: ∆t ← γ × ∆¯t−min(∆¯t)max(∆¯t)−min(∆¯t)+ ;
8: I¯t+1 ← I¯t − α∆t;
9: t← t+ 1;
10: end while
11: else
12: Select N sparse feature maps F↓i (I)) from Fi(I);
13: while (t < X or D1[F(I), F(I¯t)] ≤ τ2) do
14: Select N feature maps F↓i (I¯t)) from Fi(I¯t);
15: ∆¯t ← ∂L[F
↓
i (I¯t), F
↓
i (I)]
∂I¯t
;
16: ∆t ← γ × ∆¯t−min(∆¯t)max(∆¯t)−min(∆¯t)+ ;
17: I¯t+1 ← I¯t + α∆t;
18: t← t+ 1;
19: end while
20: end if
21: return I¯←I¯t.
saliency models to the multi-scale architectures, e.g. Sal-
GAN [3], GazeGAN [29], and DVA [31]. Specifically, we
duplicate the single-stream network as two sub-networks,
i.e. a coarse sub-network and a fine sub-network. Then we
feed the original image and the downsampled image into the
fine and coarse sub-networks, respectively. Finally, we con-
catenate the feature maps from coarse sub-network with the
feature maps from fine sub-network in channel direction to
predict final saliency map. However, experiments in Table
1 indicate that the multi-scale architectures are also highly
vulnerable to adversarial attacks on saliency detection task.
3.2. Convergence and Losses
The convergences of proposed attack when using differ-
ent losses are shown in Fig.4. For targeted attack, the losses
measure the similarity between high-dimensional represen-
tations of guide image and the adversarial example, where
the smaller losses mean the better similarity. We notice
that, all of the losses decrease rapidly in the first 20 iter-
ations, then go smoothly in the last iterations. KL and CC
converge to the theoretical boundary values, i.e. KL=0 and
CC=1. For nontargeted attack, the losses measure the sim-
ilarity between the representations of original image and
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Table 1: Performance of the proposed feature-space attack method on different threat model architectures. For the 4th-6th columns,
from left to right, the performance scores represent CC, sAUC, and SIM metrics [28] respectively, which measure the similarity between
model predictions and human fixation ground truth. The higher CC, sAUC and SIM values mean the better performance. The 3rd column
represents the intermediate layer of the threat model to be attacked. The 4th, 5th and 6th columns represent the performance of threat
model on original image, the adversarial examples generated by targeted and nontargeted attacks, respectively.
Threat Model Base Network Attacked Layer Original Performance Targeted Attack Nontargeted Attack
SALICON1 [4] multi-stream VGG-16 conv5-3-fine 0.748, 0.726, 0.723 0.279, 0.501, 0.469 -0.262, 0.390, 0.041
SALICON2 [4] multi-stream GoogleLenet inception4-fine 0.755, 0.731, 0.742 0.288, 0.514, 0.457 -0.255, 0.385, 0.042
SALICON3 [4] multi-stream AlexNet conv5-1-fine 0.719, 0.705, 0.691 0.291, 0.520, 0.463 -0.280, 0.382, 0.039
SALICON4 [4] single-stream VGG-16 conv5-3-coarse 0.700, 0.695, 0.714 0.266, 0.482, 0.428 -0.307, 0.346, 0.035
GazeGAN1 [29] single-stream U-Net decoder1-coarse 0.796, 0.740, 0.764 0.388, 0.505, 0.513 -0.424, 0.371, 0.060
GazeGAN2 [29] multi-stream U-Net decoder1-fine 0.808, 0.743, 0.769 0.419, 0.511, 0.534 -0.356, 0.382, 0.069
SalGAN1 [3] single-stream VGG-19 conv5-3-coarse 0.703, 0.707, 0.713 0.365, 0.502, 0.468 -0.471, 0.354, 0.055
SalGAN2 [3] multi-stream VGG-19 conv5-3-fine 0.719, 0.715, 0.722 0.373, 0.511, 0.486 -0.454, 0.360, 0.058
Global pix2pix [30] single-stream ResNet res9-coarse 0.766, 0.729, 0.748 0.289, 0.498, 0.469 -0.164, 0.475, 0.046
Local pix2pix [30] multi-stream ResNet res3-fine 0.773, 0.737, 0.751 0.313, 0.504, 0.435 -0.188, 0.490, 0.048
DVA1 [31] single-stream VGG-16 conv5-3-coarse 0.774, 0.733, 0.754 0.308, 0.514, 0.517 -0.400, 0.415, 0.054
DVA2 [31] multi-stream VGG-16 conv5-3-fine 0.782, 0.736, 0.760 0.312, 0.519, 0.522 -0.373, 0.454, 0.057
(a) Targeted Attack by KL loss (b) Targeted Attack by CC loss (c) Targeted Attack by NSS loss (d) Targeted Attack by L1 loss
(e) Nontargeted Attack by KL loss (f) Nontargeted Attack by CC loss (g) Nontargeted Attack by NSS loss (h) Nontargeted Attack by L1 loss
Figure 4: The convergence of the proposed attack when using different losses.
the adversarial example. KL, CC and L1 losses increase
rapidly in the first 20 iterations, while NSS loss decreases
first, then increases rapidly and approximates the boundary
value, i.e. NSS=0. This is because NSS metric calculates
mean value of the normalized saliency map at fixation lo-
cations, and is sensitive to the false positives [28]. In be-
ginning iterations, the model attention on some secondary
salient regions is distracted to the most salient regions, thus
the mean value at obvious fixation locations is increased,
i.e. -NSS value decreases. In later iterations, the model at-
tention is further distracted away from the original salient
regions until there is no overlapping regions with original
fixation locations, i.e. NSS=0. We provide more visualiza-
tions about the convergence process in the Supplementary
Material.
3.3. Perceptibility, Agressivity, and Attacked Layer
In this section, we explore the finer-grained correlation
between the properties of attacked layer (i.e. layer depth
and receptive field), and the quality (i.e. perceptibility and
agressivity) of perturbations generated by this layer.
We first investigate the relationship between the tar-
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(a) GazeGAN1 Model (b) SALICON1 Model
Figure 5: The relationship between the targeted attack perfor-
mance and the depth of the attacked layer.
(a) GazeGAN1 Model (b) SALICON1 Model
Figure 6: The relationship between perceptibility of the adversar-
ial perturbation and receptive field of the attacked layer.
geted attack performance and the depth of attacked layer,
as shown in Fig.5. We adopt CC, sAUC, SIM and AUC-
Borji metrics to measure the similarity between the pre-
dicted results of adversarial example and guide image.
Thus, the higher CC, sAUC, SIM and AUC-Borji scores
represent the better targeted attack performance. We no-
tice that, in general, the deeper hidden layers achieve the
better attack performance compared to the shallower lay-
ers. Besides, the attack performance will be greatly pro-
moted at some intermediate hidden layers. For SALICON1
model, the 12th layer significantly increase the attack per-
formance, because SALICON1 adopts a coarse-scale and a
fine-scale sub-networks, and the 12th layer concatenates the
feature maps from two sub-networks. This indicates that,
for multi-scale architecture, attacking the layers of front-
end sub-networks has slight impact on final model predic-
tion, while attacking the deeper layers that pooling the fea-
tures from sub-networks will revolutionize the final output.
For GazeGAN1, the 6th layer achieves a satisfying attack
performance compared to the deeper layers including the
image-space attack (i.e. the 17th layer). In other word, if we
obtain the information of the 1th-6th layers of GazeGAN1,
we can change the output of entire model completely.
Next, we investigate the relationship between percepti-
bility of generated perturbation and the receptive field of at-
tacked layer, as shown in Fig.6. We use two metrics to eval-
uate the perceptibility of adversarial perturbation, i.e. SSIM
and 2-norm distance. SSIM [34] is a popular quality met-
ric to measure the perceptual similarity of original image
(a) GazeGAN2 Model (b) SALICON1 Model
Figure 7: This figure explores how many sparse feature maps are able to
perform a successful attack for a certain hidden layer.
(a) Feature-space Attack (b) Image-space Attack
Figure 8: This figure explores where (at which layers) does the
threat model (SalGAN1) start to spoil when suffering from attacks.
and adversarial example, and 2-norm distance [23] mea-
sures the magnitude of perturbation. The higher SSIM and
the lower 2-norm distance represent the lower perceptibility.
Experiments indicate that the layers with the bigger recep-
tive fields generate more imperceptible perturbations.
Then, we explore that, for a certain hidden layer, how
many sparse feature maps are qualified to perform a suc-
cessful feature-space attack. The correlation between the
attack performance and the amount of channels of sparse
feature-maps is shown in Fig.7. Specifically, we select 1,
8, 16 , 32, ... feature maps from the 1024 feature maps of
the 10th (12th) hidden layer of GazeGAN2 (SALICON1)
model, respectively. Then we compare the attack perfor-
mance caused by different amount of feature channels. We
notice that, for GazeGAN2, 32 feature maps can generate a
satisfying perturbation compared to using all 1024 feature
maps. For SALICON1, 64 feature maps can perform a sat-
isfying attack, but there is still a gap compared to using all
1024 feature maps. In other word, GazeGAN2 is easier to
be attacked compared to SALICON1, because there are too
many similar and residual representations in feature space
of GazeGAN2. However, the performance of SALICON1
on clean images is worse than GazeGAN2. We borrow the
conclusion proposed by Su et al. [35] to explain this case:
For image classification models, there is a clear trade-off
between accuracy and robustness, and a better performance
in testing accuracy reduces robustness. For saliency detec-
tion task, most of deep saliency models adopt similar base
networks used in classification task as feature extractors.
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Finally, we investigate where (at which layer) does the
threat model start to spoil when suffering from feature-
space and image-space attacks, as shown in Fig.8. For each
hidden layer, we adopt SSIM and CC metrics to measure
the similarity between intermediate feature maps of orig-
inal image and adversarial example. The lower SSIM and
CC values mean that the model attention has been distracted
away from the salient regions of original image. We unify
the resolution (i.e. height×width) of feature maps from dif-
ferent layers as 60×80, for fair comparison. We find that,
SalGAN1 model starts to spoil from the 7th layer, which is a
context hidden layer with a big receptive field, and extracts
more high-level semantic information rather than low-level
texture and edges. Besides, the feature-space and image-
space attacks will destroy the SalGAN1 model at a similar
position, i.e. the 7th hidden layer here.
3.4. Transferability and Countervailing Relation
Fig.9 shows the transferability of proposed feature-space
attack across different models. We adopt CC metric to
measure the performance drop caused by different pertur-
bations generated by different models. The higher perfor-
mance drop represents a better transferability. Experiments
indicate that transferability between different networks is
weak, and the perturbations generated by other networks
only result in a slight performance drop. This case is con-
sistent with the attacks for segmentation and object detec-
tion tasks [20]. Besides, for single-stream and multi-scale
models which utilize similar base networks, i.e. DVA1 vs
DVA2, SalGAN1 vs SalGAN2, GazeGAN1 vs GazeGAN2,
the transferability is still weak. This indicates that the va-
lidity of proposed perturbation is highly depended on the
thread model, including base network and architecture.
In Fig.10, we explore weather the perturbations gen-
erated by different losses (or spaces) can mitigate each
other. Specifically, we select one type of loss to gener-
ate a perturbation from image/feature space, and subtract
it from the adversarial examples generated by unknown at-
tacks. Then we adopt CC metric to measure the perfor-
mance drop caused by the modified adversarial example.
GazeGAN1 serves as threat model here. Experiments in-
dicate that, for targeted attack, perturbations generated by
KL and CC losses from image-space can mitigate each
other, but the other perturbations have discrepant patterns
and are not able to countervail with each other. For non-
targeted attack, the perturbations generated by KL and CC
losses from image-space are able to mitigate other pertur-
bations generated by different losses from both image and
feature spaces to a certain extent. Besides, the feature-space
perturbations can mitigate the perturbations generated by
feature-space attack (i.e. regions in the yellow rectangle
in Fig.10 (b)), but have slight impact on the perturbations
from image-space (i.e. regions in the red rectangle in Fig.10
(a) Targeted Attack (b) Nontargeted Attack
Figure 9: The transferability of proposed attack across different models.
The vertical axis represents the target threat models, while the horizontal
axis represents the source threat models. We use the perturbations gener-
ated by source models to attack the target models.
(a) Targeted Attack (b) Nontargeted Attack
Figure 10: The countervailing relationship between different perturba-
tions generated by different losses (Mix means the linear combination of
KL, CC, NSS and L1 losses), and generated by image-space and feature-
space attacks. The vertical axis represents the target losses, while the hori-
zontal axis represents the source losses. We use the perturbations generated
by source losses to mitigate perturbations generated by target losses.
(b)). This indicates that the perturbations from feature-
space have more similar patterns compared to perturbations
from image-space. Besides, the perturbations from image-
space are much denser, and can be harnessed to mitigate the
sparser feature-space perturbations to a certain extent.
We perform a similar experiment as [20], which is ran-
domly permuting the rows or columns of the adversarial
perturbation. We find that the permuted perturbation fails
to attack the models, indicating that the spatial structure of
the perturbation is critical to the adversarial attack. How-
ever, we can not use this method to defend attack, because
it also destroys the spatial information of original image.
4. Conclusion
We propose a sparse feature-space adversarial attack
method against saliency models for the first time. The pro-
posed method generates a sparser and more visually imper-
ceptible adversarial perturbation. Besides, it only requires
partial information regarding the threat model, and com-
pletely changes the final prediction of the entire network.
We further verify that the quality (i.e. aggressivity, percep-
tibility and diversity) of the generated adversarial pertur-
bation is related to loss functions, the depth and receptive
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field of attacked layer, and the amount of channels of sparse
feature maps. Our work also provides lessons for devising
defense method in the future: First, a good defense method
should consider the category of perturbations, because dif-
ferent losses and attacked layers will result in discrepant
perturbation patterns. Second, defense method should dis-
criminate the validity of perturbations in advance, because
some invalid perturbations cannot disturb the model predic-
tion at all, e.g. the perturbations generated by shallower
hidden layers or generated by other model architectures.
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